From 00ac83323d12b90f05260f9ab343899096659d20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chen Yang <yc4646@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 15:42:03 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Updated the abstract of AMM paper.

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@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ Portfolio Selection; Market Frictions; FinTech; Market Microstructure; Stochasti
     <b>submitted</b>. [<a href="" onclick="toggleAbstract('abs_AMM');return false">Abstract</a>|<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4801468" target="_blank">SSRN</a>|<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.13291" target="_blank">arXiv</a>]<br>
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-        <i>Automated market makers are a popular type of decentralized exchange in which users trade assets with each other directly and automatically through a liquidity pool and a fixed pricing function. The liquidity provider contributes to the liquidity pool by supplying assets to the pool and in return they earn transaction fees from traders who trade through the pool. We propose a model of optimal liquidity provision in which the risk-averse liquidity provider decides the investment proportion of wealth she would like to supply to the pool, trade in a centralized market, and consume in multiple periods. We derive the liquidity provider's optimal strategy by dynamic programming and numerically find the optimal liquidity pool that maximizes the liquidity provider's utility. Our findings indicate that the exchange rate volatility on the centralized market exerts a positive effect on the optimal transaction fee. Moreover, the optimal constant mean pricing formula is found to be related to the relative performance of the underlying assets on the centralized market.</i>
+        <i>Automated market makers are a popular mechanism used on decentralized exchange, through which users trade assets with each other directly and automatically through a liquidity pool and a fixed pricing function. The liquidity provider contributes to the liquidity pool by supplying assets to the pool, and in return, they earn trading fees from investors who trade in the pool. We propose a model of optimal liquidity provision in which a risk-averse liquidity provider decides the amount of wealth she would invest in the decentralized market to provide liquidity in a two-asset pool, trade in a centralized market, and consume in multiple periods. We derive the liquidity provider's optimal strategy and the optimal design of the automated market maker that maximizes the liquidity provider's utility. We find that the optimal unit trading fee increases in the volatility of the fundamental exchange rate of the two assets. We also find that the optimal pricing function is chosen to make the asset allocation in the liquidity pool efficient for the liquidity provider.</i>
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